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A Sober Approach to Drugged Driving: Oklahoma’s HB 
1441 and the Role of Courts 
I. Introduction 
In May of 2013, the Oklahoma legislature passed and the Governor 
signed into law House Bill 1441 (HB 1441), which made various 
amendments to Oklahoma’s statutes concerning driving under the influence 
of an intoxicating substance (DUI).1 Most notably, HB 1441 expanded DUI 
liability to include anyone who has in her body any amount of a Schedule I 
chemical or controlled substance or its metabolite.2 While a few outside 
commentators have dismissed this reform as an Oklahoman anomaly,3 in 
fact, many states have DUI laws concerning illicit metabolites.4 In most 
states, these laws elicit strong opposition from legal commentators.5 In 
Oklahoma too, the law has been met with some outrage.6 Resistance to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. H.B. 1441, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013) (codified at 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-902 
(Supp. 2013)). 
 2. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-902(A)(3). 
 3. E.g., Nicci Francis, Past Pot Use Can Bring DUI Charges in Oklahoma, EXAMINER 
(June 21, 2013, 1:54 PM), http://www.examiner.com/article/past-pot-use-can-bring-dui-
charges-oklahoma (“Chalk it up to one of those strange Oklahoma laws. . . .”). 
 4. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-1381(A)(1) (2012), repealed by Arizona ex rel. 
Montgomery v. Harris, 346 P.3d 984 (Ariz. 2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-6-391(a)(2) (West 
2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-5-1(c) (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.20(7) (West 
2009) (excluding marijuana metabolites); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484C.110(3)(c), (e), (h) 
(West 2012), amended by S.144, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015) (limited to specific 
amounts of certain metabolites); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-138.1 (West 2006); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 4511.19(G)(1) (West Supp. 2013) (limited to specific amounts of certain 
metabolites), repealed by State v. Klembus, 2014-Ohio-3227, 17 N.E.3d 603. 
 5. See, e.g., Charles R. Cordova, Jr., Note, DWI and Drugs: A Look at Per Se Laws for 
Marijuana, 7 NEV. L.J. 570, 575 (2007); Darron J. Hubbard, Narcotics on Illinois’s 
Roadways: Drugged Driving’s Ill Effects After Martin, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 591, 604 (2013); 
Matthew C. Rappold, Criminal Law—Evidence of Inactive Drug Metabolites in DUI Cases: 
Using a Proximate Cause Analysis to Fill the Evidentiary Gap Between Prior Drug Use and 
Driving Under the Influence, 32 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 535, 537 (2010); Joshua C. 
Snow, The Unconstitutional Prosecution of Controlled Substance Metabolites Under Utah 
Code § 41-6A-517, 2013 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW 195, 202. 
 6. See, e.g., Francis, supra note 3; Paul Armentano, Oklahoma Becomes Third State 
This Year to Approve Unscientific Per Se Limits for Cannabis, NORML BLOG (June 11, 
2013) http://blog.norml.org/2013/06/11/oklahoma-becomes-third-state-this-year-to-approve-
unscientific-per-se-limits-for-cannabis/; Alex Bischoff, High Road: Oklahoma’s New 
Marijuana Law, THIS LAND PRESS (July 23, 2013), http://thislandpress.com/roundups/high-
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“drugged-driving laws” arises because, as courts have acknowledged, the 
metabolites of many illegal substances—particularly cocaine and 
marijuana—remain detectable in a user’s bodily fluids long after the 
intoxicating effect of those substances dissipates.7 This means that liability 
for “driving under the influence” can attach to an individual who is actually 
unimpaired while behind the wheel. This seems an inappropriate result—
one that divorces punishment from criminal culpability—as the following 
hypothetical example of enforcement illustrates:8 
A college student at the University of Oklahoma takes a spring break ski 
trip to Colorado. Having never tried marijuana but knowing the state 
recently legalized its use,9 she smokes some with friends. She does not 
enjoy the experience and decides that her first experiment with drugs will 
be her last.  
Weeks later, back in Norman, the same student is involved in an 
automobile collision and is taken unconscious to the hospital. As is routine 
in such cases, the hospital runs a screening of her blood for intoxicating 
substances. When they arrive at the hospital, the student’s parents are 
relieved to hear that she has sustained only minor injuries. However, they 
                                                                                                                 
road-oklahomas-new-marijuana-law/ (citing public outrage); James M. Wirth, Everybody Is 
Guilty Under Oklahoma’s Zero-Tolerance Metabolite DUI-D Law, TULSA ATTORNEY BLOG 
(Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.wirthlawoffice.com/tulsa-attorney-blog/2013/10/everybody-
guilty-oklahomas-zero-tolerance-metabolite-dui-d-law. 
 7. Estrich v. State, 995 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (accepting expert 
testimony that “marijuana metabolite in the defendant's blood sample likely would not have 
affected [defendant]”); Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302, 308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) 
(finding “[t]hat metabolite is a waste product of marijuana,” not evidence of active 
marijuana and “fails to establish that Appellant was under the influence”); Commonwealth 
v. DiPanfilo, 993 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (“[T]he presence of metabolites 
only showed that Appellant consumed marijuana some time in the past.”). But see State v. 
Hammonds, 968 P.2d 601, 603 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that many drugs will appear in 
metabolic form when inactive and that the inactive form would not cause impairment); Head 
v. State, 693 S.E.2d 845, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that cocaine “metabolite in one’s 
blood ‘is not indicative of any impairment because it is the after-effect’” of consumption); 
Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (acknowledging 
Appellant’s argument that the government’s witness testified that marijuana metabolites in 
the bloodstream “are not an indication of present impairment”). 
 8. It is worth noting that some variation of this hypothetical is presented by several 
commenters on drugged-driving laws. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 5, at 591; Rappold, 
supra note 5, at 535; Snow, supra note 5, at 195.  
 9. Niraj Chokshi, Marijuana Sales Commence in Colorado for Recreational Use, WASH. 
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are shocked when they learn that tests discovered tetrahydrocannabinol, a 
metabolite of marijuana,10 in their daughter’s blood and that she has been 
charged with a DUI. 
Believing that such a scenario is unacceptable, several legal scholars 
argue that metabolite-specific drugged-driving laws run afoul of one or 
more constitutional principles.11 Those charged under similar laws in other 
states have occasionally challenged these laws as unconstitutional.12 These 
challenges have been largely unsuccessful.13 Nevertheless, some have also 
suggested Oklahoma’s law should be challenged.14 This Comment 
considers the constitutional viability of HB 1441. Each part of this 
Comment analyzes a different constitutional challenge either proposed by 
opponents of drugged-driving laws, or, in many cases, tested before the 
courts of other states that have such laws. An analysis of each of the 
potential challenges to drugged-driving laws ultimately suggests Oklahoma 
courts are highly unlikely to invalidate HB 1441.  
Part II of this Comment analyzes the constitutional doctrine of 
overbreadth, considering whether HB 1441 reaches beyond its legitimate 
sweep to substantially interfere with constitutionally protected activity. Part 
III analyzes the void-for-vagueness doctrine, asking whether the language 
of HB 1441 is so ambiguous as to be constitutionally inadequate. Part IV 
considers an equal protection challenge. Part V reviews the Oklahoma 
Constitution’s prohibition on special laws, inquiring into whether HB 1441 
might violate the requirement that laws in the state be general in their 
operation. Part VI considers a potential Eighth Amendment challenge that 
cites U.S. Supreme Court precedent to argue that HB 1441 impermissibly 
creates a status offense with no concern for actual criminal conduct. Part 
VII concludes that, while each of these hypothetical challenges bring to 
light in their own way the imprudence of HB 1441, Oklahoma courts are 
likely without basis to invalidate the Act. Ultimately, although HB 1441 
probably offends basic notions of criminal justice premised on moral 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Marilyn A. Huestis, John M. Mitchell & Edward J. Cone, Detection Times of 
Marijuana Metabolites in Urine by Immunosay and GC-MS, 19 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 
443, 444 (1995). 
 11. Cordova, Jr., supra note 5, at 581-83; Hubbard, supra note 5, at 608-09; Snow, 
supra note 5, at 209. 
 12. See, e.g., Hammonds, 968 P.2d at 602; State v. Phillip, 873 P.2d 706, 707 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1994); Head, 693 S.E.2d at 846; Williams v. State, 50 P.3d 1116, 1118 (Nev. 2002); 
State v. Whalen, 991 N.E.2d 733, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1171. 
 13. See Hammonds, 968 P.2d at 606; Phillips, 873 P.2d at 710; Head, 693 S.E.2d at 
846; Williams, 50 P.3d at 1121-22; Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1174. 
 14. See, e.g., Francis, supra note 3.  
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culpability and authorizes untenable practical consequences, Oklahomans’ 
hope for repeal lies not with the courts, but with the same legislature that 
recently enacted the law. 
II. Overbreadth 
Some academics have proposed,15 and some state courts have 
considered,16 overbreadth challenges to laws like HB 1441. Those 
challenging a legislative enactment as overbroad do so by illustrating “some 
aggregate number of unconstitutional applications of an otherwise valid 
rule of law.”17 In the drugged-driving context, “the crux” of the overbreadth 
argument is that “the presence of metabolites of marijuana and/or other 
prohibited drugs in one's bloodstream does not correlate to impairment and 
as such is not rationally related to [a] DUI statute's purpose of preventing 
unsafe drivers from driving.”18  
Some state court judges have sympathized with this position. 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Bender, dissenting in Commonwealth 
v. Etchison, argued that his state’s statute19—very similar in language to 
Oklahoma’s—was invalid as overbroad.20 For Justice Bender, “punishing 
mere presence in one's blood of metabolites of Schedule I drugs, without 
proof of impairment . . . goes too far.”21 The majority was not persuaded.22 
For reasons explained below, Oklahoma courts are also unlikely to accept 
an overbreadth challenge to HB 1441.  
A. Traditional Overbreadth Challenges: Requirement of Constitutional 
Protection 
An overbreadth challenge typically arises when a criminal statute affects 
speech or conduct that is arguably protected by the First Amendment.23 In 
fact, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Virginia v. Hicks, suggested that 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See, e.g., Cordova, Jr., supra note 5, at 575-76. 
 16. See, e.g., Whalen, 991 N.E.2d at 743; Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1173; Williams, 50 P.3d 
at 1123; Phillips, 873 P.2d at 708-09. 
 17. Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule 
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 363 (1998). 
 18. Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1176 (Bender, J., concurring and dissenting).  
 19. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3802 (West 2006), invalidated by Commonwealth v. 
Duda, 923 A.2d 1138 (Pa. 2007). 
 20. 916 A.2d at 1176. 
 21. Id. at 1178.  
 22. Id. at 1170-74.  
 23. See, e.g., Virginia v Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 124 (2003). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/3
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“[r]arely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or 
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or to conduct 
necessarily associated with speech.”24 Some state courts have adhered to 
this practice as well.25 Because there is no apparent precedent on the 
question, it is unclear whether Oklahoma courts would accept an 
overbreadth challenge outside of the First Amendment context. However, it 
is clear that Oklahoma courts would require, at minimum, that such claims 
allege that the disputed law restricts some form of constitutionally protected 
conduct or activity.26 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has formulated the rule 
this way: “[a] statute . . . is overbroad if it prohibits constitutionally 
protected conduct as well as conduct that states can constitutionally 
restrict.”27 Accordingly, when a Tulsa County District Court invalidated as 
overbroad a statute that allowed the seizure of alcohol from violators of the 
state’s “open saloon law,” the Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the 
district court’s decision.28 The court held that overbreadth analysis was 
inapposite because no “constitutionally protected activity” was at issue.29  
Justice Bender suggests in his Commonwealth v. Etchison dissent that 
courts have applied the overbreadth doctrine when no constitutional rights 
are at stake.30 To support this argument, Justice Bender cites two cases.31 
The first is Commonwealth v. Barud, a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case 
that invalidated a statute punishing operation of a vehicle if a test taken 
within three hours after driving revealed a blood alcohol content of .10% or 
greater.32 There, the court reasoned that the statute was overbroad because a 
test taken three hours after driving would not indicate whether the 
accused’s blood alcohol content was above the legal limit while she was 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. E.g., State v. Whalen, 991 N.E.2d 738, 743 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013). 
 26. See, e.g., Conchito v. City of Tulsa, 1974 OK CR 82, ¶ 6, 521 P.2d 1384, 1386, 
1974 (“The overbreadth doctrine is founded upon the principle of substantive due process 
which forbids governments to prohibit certain freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.”); 
see also Allen v. City of Oklahoma City, 1998 OK CR 42, ¶ 5, 965 P.2d 387, 389 n.7 (“The 
overbreadth doctrine evolved from the need to protect certain freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution from governmental intrusion.”).  
 27. In re Initiative Petition No. 341, 1990 OK 53, ¶ 5, 796 P.2d 267, 269.  
 28. Okla. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Parkhill Rests., Inc., 1983 OK 77, ¶ 8, 669 
P.2d 265, 269.  
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., 916 A.2d 1169, 1178 (Bender, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 31. Id. 
 32. 681 A.2d 162, 162 (Pa. 1996). 
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behind the wheel.33 Essentially, the statute went farther than simply 
penalizing drunk driving by also punishing those who were sober while 
driving but, for whatever reason, drunk three hours later. Justice Bender 
reads artfully into the Barud court’s holding that “the statute sweeps 
unnecessarily broadly into activity which has not been declared unlawful in 
this Commonwealth.”34 Cleverly, he distinguishes the claim that some 
activity has not been declared unlawful from the claim that such activity is 
constitutionally protected, justifying this distinction by juxtaposing an 
earlier decision that used the language of constitutionality in finding no 
right to drive after consuming alcohol.35  
To the extent that Justice Bender is right—that the Pennsylvania court 
applied the overbreadth doctrine while deliberately avoiding a holding on 
constitutional grounds—a review of the case law suggests that such a 
decision is anomalous and against the weight of authority outside that 
jurisdiction. The only case that Justice Bender cites outside of Pennsylvania 
is Stanley v. Georgia.36 In that case, the United States Supreme Court struck 
down a Georgia law making it a crime to knowingly possess obscene 
material.37 As Justice Bender observes, the Court did note that the First 
Amendment has never been held to protect obscene material.38 However, 
the Court took great care to distinguish previous decisions that concerned 
mailing or selling obscene materials from the instant case in which mere 
possession of the material was at issue.39 The Court found that previous 
cases denied the First Amendment’s protection to “certain public actions” 
with respect to obscenity, but that none spoke to the question of solely 
private possession of obscene material.40  
Far from disregarding the question of constitutional protection, then, the 
Stanley Court based its decision to invalidate the Georgia law on the First 
Amendment’s broad guarantee of the “right to receive information and 
ideas” and the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection from “unwanted 
governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”41 In order to appreciate the 
extent of the Stanley Court’s commitment to the Constitution—and to rebut 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 166. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1178.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).  
 38. Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1178 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560)). 
 39. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 560-64. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 564. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/3
2015]       COMMENTS 839 
 
 
Justice Bender’s assertion that the Court “applied the overbreadth principle 
to activity that did not enjoy a specific constitutional protection”42—it is 
necessary to quote the Court’s decision at length: 
These are the rights that appellant is asserting in the case before 
us . . . the right to read or observe what he pleases . . . to satisfy 
his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own 
home . . . to be free from state inquiry into the contents of his 
library. . . . [M]ere categorization of these films as ‘obscene’ is 
insufficient justification for such a drastic invasion of personal 
liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. . . . If the First Amendment means anything, it 
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in 
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may 
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of 
giving government the power to control men's minds.43  
Justice Bender’s analysis seems to ignore the Court’s central and explicit 
holding that “the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere 
private possession of obscene material a crime.”44 Moreover, to the extent 
that any court applying overbreadth analysis has disregarded the question of 
whether the activity restricted by the disputed law is constitutionally 
protected, there are no apparent examples in Oklahoma.  
B. Modern Overbreadth Challenges: Substantial Interference 
In a landmark overbreadth case that, interestingly, arose out of 
Oklahoma law, the United States Supreme Court further refined 
overbreadth analysis. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court upheld an 
Oklahoma statute regulating the political activities of certain state 
employees and in so doing increased the burden of a petitioner alleging 
overbreadth.45 There, the statute in question was written so broadly as to 
prohibit an official from even indirectly soliciting contributions for political 
purposes or participating in the management of the affairs of any political 
party or candidate.46 Appellants who challenged the law argued that such 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1178.  
 43. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.  
 44. Id. at 568. 
 45. 413 U.S. 601, 602 (1973).  
 46. Id. at 605-06. 
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language could be construed to proscribe clearly protected activities such as 
wearing political buttons or displaying bumper stickers.47  
Despite these concerns, the Broadrick Court characterized the 
overbreadth doctrine as “strong medicine,” which should be used “sparingly 
and only as a last resort.”48 The doctrine’s function, according to the Court, 
“attenuates” as the nature of the conduct that it forbids the state to regulate 
approaches “the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect 
legitimate state interests.”49 The Court acknowledged that such laws, 
broadly construed, might deter protected expressions.50 However, as the 
probability of a law interfering with protected activity decreases, the Court 
reasoned, “there comes a point where that effect—at best a prediction—
cannot, with confidence, justify . . . prohibiting a State from enforcing [a] 
statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to proscribe.”51 
Therefore, “particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved,” 
the Court held “the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but 
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate 
sweep.”52  
This requirement—that a statute substantially interfere with 
constitutionally protected activity in order to be considered overbroad—is a 
stubborn one. When considering an overbreadth challenge, “a court’s first 
task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of 
constitutionally protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth 
challenge must fail.”53 Moreover, when slight or potential overbreadth is 
suspected, the court must consider whether there is a viable interpretation of 
the statute that would confine it to permissible application.54 When this 
limiting construction is available, the court will prefer this interpretation to 
that which renders the law invalid.55  
Oklahoma courts take this approach as well, especially where criminal 
statutes are at issue.56 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has held 
that “[w]here an act is readily subject to a narrowing construction which 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 609-10. 
 48. Id. at 613. 
 49. Id. at 615. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
 53. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 
(1981).  
 54. See, e.g., Conchito v. City of Tulsa, 1974 OK CR 82, ¶ 5, 521 P.2d 1384, 1386.  
 55. Conchito, ¶ 10, 521 P.2d at 1387; see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16. 
 56. Gilbert v. State, 1988 OK CR 268, ¶ 7, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol67/iss4/3
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would avoid violation of the overbreadth doctrine, then that narrow 
construction should be applied and the act should be upheld against a facial 
challenge.”57 Because a limiting construction is to be considered, a court 
must consider any ambiguity in a statute’s language.58 “To this extent, the 
vagueness of a law affects overbreadth analysis.”59 The vagueness doctrine 
will be considered in Part III. Presently, it suffices to say that the courts are 
only interested in overbreadth challenges to the most offensive statutes. 
Such statutes must, at a minimum, substantially interfere with a zone of 
constitutionally protected activity.  
C. State Applications of Overbreadth to Drugged-Driving Laws 
These formulations of the law bode poorly for those who would 
challenge drugged-driving statutes as overbroad. It is perhaps not surprising 
then that the few courts to consider these challenges have been 
categorically dismissive. For example, the Supreme Court of Nevada hardly 
began its overbreadth analysis before summarily concluding that the state’s 
DUI metabolite law affected no constitutionally protected conduct and so 
the argument was without merit.60 Similarly, in Etchison, the majority 
wasted little time on the overbreadth question, finding that Pennsylvania’s 
law punished no constitutionally protected activity.61 Ohio and Arizona 
courts have assigned such challenges even less credibility, holding that the 
overbreadth doctrine applies only to First Amendment grievances and that 
none were presented by metabolite laws in those jurisdictions.62 In no state 
did the court make it past the first question of overbreadth analysis—
whether the challenged law reaches substantially into constitutionally 
protected conduct. The challenge ended there. 
D. Overbreadth Challenge to HB 1441: Unlikely to Prevail 
Opponents of Oklahoma’s HB 1441 have little reason to suppose that 
Oklahoma courts would analyze an overbreadth challenge any differently 
from others. The first task of the court would be to inquire as to whether the 
law overreaches to substantially interfere with constitutionally protected 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. 
 58. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.6 
(1981). 
 59. Id.  
 60. Williams v. State, 50 P.3d 1116, 1123-24 (Nev. 2002). 
 61. Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 62. State v. Whalen, 991 N.E.2d 738, 743 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); State v. Phillips, 873 
P.2d 706, 709 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
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conduct. As other courts have recognized, there is neither a constitutional 
right to use illicit drugs nor to drive.63 In fact, the statute’s reference to 
Schedule I controlled substances and its provision for license revocation64 
suggest unequivocally that the consumption of such substances is not only 
unprotected but also illegal and that driving is a revocable privilege.  
The Court of Criminal Appeals has articulated the most lenient, if 
anomalous, phrasings of the overbreadth rule in Oklahoma. In Hayes v. 
Municipal Court, where that court invalidated an anti-loitering statute 
enacted by Oklahoma City,65 the court announced in its syllabus that 
“[o]verbroad legislation is constitutionally defective if it extends state 
criminal authority beyond the proper reach of government into the protected 
private area.”66 Here again, however, the term “protected private area” was 
given meaning by its comparison to those areas constitutionally subject to 
state regulation.67 Because schedule I substances are within the state’s 
regulatory power, this version of the rule offers no more hope for a 
prospective challenge to HB 1441. Another liberal phrasing of the rule 
stated by the Court of Criminal Appeals in upholding the Securities Act 
provided that “[a]n Act is unconstitutionally overbroad only if it proscribes 
illegal as well as legal conduct.”68 Again, this version is of no use to 
Oklahomans opposing HB 1441 as the conduct with which the law 
interferes—the consumption of illicit drugs—is not legal; it is, in fact, 
criminal.  
E. Concluding Overbreadth: Various “What Ifs” and the Substantiality 
Requirement 
Returning to the dissent in Etchison, Justice Bender remained convinced, 
notwithstanding the weight of authority, that a Pennsylvania law holding a 
driver with metabolites in his system criminally liable under the state’s DUI 
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.69 In coming to this conclusion, 
Justice Bender was especially concerned that “marijuana can appear in 
one's system without the unlawful usage of marijuana and through both 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See, e.g., Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1173; Williams, 50 P.3d at 1120.  
 64. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-902 (Supp. 2013). 
 65. 1971 OK CR 274, ¶ 33, 487 P.2d 974, 981. 
 66. Id. ¶ 19, 487 P.2d at 979 (holding the Oklahoma City ordinance to be overbroad “as 
it invades protected freedoms and punishes conduct which in no way impinges on the rights 
or interests of others).  
 67. Id. ¶¶ 22-23, 487 P.2d at 978-79. 
 68. Armstrong v. State, 1991 OK CR 34, ¶ 20, 811 P.2d 593, 598. 
 69. Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
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voluntary and involuntary consumption,” citing myriad hypothetical 
examples ranging from legal use in a jurisdiction that allows for marijuana 
consumption to police officers being secretly dosed by fast food 
employees.70  
While Justice Bender’s hypotheticals are undoubtedly concerning, they 
likely do not warrant overbreadth consideration. A law that punishes an 
individual for simply having a substance in her system—without requiring 
evidence that she knowingly ingested it or behaved irresponsibly while 
under its influence—invites the imagining of various unjust applications. 
However, citing the Broadrick Court’s reasoning that predictable but 
improbable scenarios of overreach are not sufficiently substantial to warrant 
the invalidation of a law in its entirety, courts have largely been consistent 
in dismissing overbreadth challenges premised on such fanciful 
speculation.71 For example, in Sabri v. United States, the Supreme Court 
noted that overbreadth challenges reliant on hypothetical scenarios not 
before the court are “especially to be discouraged” because “they invite 
judgments on fact-poor records” and require a “departure from the norms of 
adjudication” in “relaxing familiar requirements of standing.”72  
In courts affecting Oklahomans most regularly, the sentiment has been 
the same. The Tenth Circuit has rejected hypothetical reasoning noting that 
“courts are not ‘roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the 
validity of the nations laws,’ but instead address only specific ‘cases’ and 
‘controversies.’”73 Moreover, the Oklahoma Supreme Court echoed this 
sentiment when upholding the constitutionality of a ban on cockfighting in 
the state.74 The court noted that, “even if it may be susceptible of some 
improper applications . . . this reach is incidental and insubstantial in 
relation to the legitimate purpose.”75 Indeed, “the mere fact that one can 
conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is not sufficient to 
render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.”76  
Thus, while opponents to HB 1441 make a persuasive case that the 
statute ought to have been written more precisely—for example to exclude 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id. at 1177. 
 71. E.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609-10 (2004). 
 72. Id. at 609.  
 73. Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Citizens Concerned 
for Separation of Church & State v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1295 (10th Cir. 
1980)). 
 74. Edmonson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, ¶ 49, 91 P.3d 605, 630.  
 75. Id. ¶ 60, 91 P.3d at 633.  
 76. Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800 (1984).  
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non-active metabolites or require a showing that the metabolite detected 
was impairing at the time of driving—these arguments are unlikely to 
persuade judges. In Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged the plausibility of alternatives 
to the disputed ordinance that “would have had a less severe effect,” noting 
that even when “[p]lausible public policy arguments” point to a wiser 
formulation of the statute, “it by no means follows that it is therefore 
constitutionally mandated.”77 These observations considered, “the crux”78 
of the overbreadth argument, as relied on by Justice Bender, seems to get it 
wrong.  
III. Vagueness 
 “A law that does not reach constitutionally protected conduct and 
therefore satisfies the overbreadth test may nevertheless be challenged on 
its face as unduly vague. . . .”79 The Supreme Court has long recognized 
that “[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to 
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed 
as to what the State commands or forbids.”80 It appears, however, that some 
confusion exists among courts about the constitutional basis for the 
vagueness doctrine. For example, in Armstrong v. State, the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals apparently based its analysis on due process 
considerations.81 In another case, however, the United States Supreme 
Court rejected an Oklahoma court’s vagueness analysis because “it presents 
a Due Process Clause approach to vagueness and fails to recognize the 
rationale of our cases construing and applying the Eighth Amendment.”82 
However, these differing constitutional justifications share a reliance on a 
basic principle. Specifically, “statutes creating criminal offenses must be 
drawn in language sufficient to apprise the public of exactly what conduct 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. at 815-16.  
 78. Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). 
 79. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 
(1982).  
 80. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). 
 81. 1991 OK CR 34, ¶ 20, 811 P.2d 593, 598; see also Ohio v. Whalen, 991 N.E.2d 
738, 742 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (“The vagueness doctrine, which is premised on the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, requires a statute to give fair notice 
of offending conduct.”). 
 82. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988).  
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is forbidden”83 and to “furnish[] a reasonably definite and ascertainable 
standard of guilt.”84 Holding the legislature to this standard is necessary to 
ensure “‘government by clearly defined laws’” as opposed to “the moment-
to-moment opinions of a policeman on his beat.’”85 
Perhaps the most oft-cited rule for guiding vagueness analysis is that 
handed down by the United States Supreme Court in Connally v. General 
Construction Co.86 In that case, the Court announced that a statute is void 
for vagueness if it “either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application.”87 In accordance with this rule, 
Oklahoma courts have required “that an enactment be voided for vagueness 
if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.”88 
While the rule may seem simple, there are two classes of “ordinary 
[people]” the law concerns and therefore at least two independent reasons 
for invalidating a vague statute. One reason concerns notice for those whom 
the law affects. That is, a statute is void for vagueness “if it fails to provide 
people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what 
conduct it prohibits.”89 The other reason concerns guidelines for 
enforcement on behalf of those who must apply the law.90 Accordingly, a 
statute is void for vagueness “if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.”91 The United States Supreme Court 
seems to believe that “the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 
‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the 
requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Hayes v. Municipal Court of Oklahoma City, 1971 OK CR 274, ¶ 6, 487 P.2d 974, 
976. 
 84. Herndon v Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 255 (1937).  
 85. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965) (quoting Cox v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 579 (1965)). 
 86. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).  
 87. Id. at 391. 
 88. Pegg v. State, 1983 OK CR 26, ¶ 4, 659 P.2d 370, 372. 
 89. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).  
 90. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“[T]he void-for-vagueness 
doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness 
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 
601, 607 (1972) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)) (asking 
whether the statute in question “fails to give adequate warning of what activities it proscribes 
or fails to set out ‘explicit standards’ for those who must apply it”). 
 91. Hill, 530 U.S. at 732. 
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enforcement.’”92 Oklahoma apparently shares that view.93 That said, 
“[o]bjections to vagueness . . . rest on the lack of notice, and hence may be 
overcome in any specific case where reasonable persons would know that 
their conduct is at risk.”94 Finally, as with overbreadth, “the most important 
factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is whether 
it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.”95 
A. Vagueness and Standing 
The vagueness doctrine also raises interesting questions of standing. That 
is, “[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed 
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of 
others.”96 There may be an exception to this rule in the event that First 
Amendment freedoms are at stake,97 but otherwise, a court will, at the very 
least, “examine the complainant’s conduct before analyzing other 
hypothetical applications of the law.”98 This tendency comports with the 
Broadrick Court’s insistence that “a person to whom a statute may 
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on the 
ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, in 
other situations not before the Court.”99 Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated a willingness to reverse the decisions of a lower court when 
that court’s vagueness analysis does not comply with these instructions.100  
This rule of standing likely presents problems for the most probable 
defendant in an Oklahoma drugged-driving case. It is reasonable to assume 
that the typical defendant in such a case intentionally consumed illegal 
drugs within some reasonably recent time prior to driving. This can be 
assumed, first, because only a few Schedule I substances produce 
metabolites that linger for weeks.101 Second, those with metabolites in their 
                                                                                                                 
 92. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (internal citations omitted). 
 93. Edmonson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, ¶ 48, 91 P.3d 605, 630. 
 94. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988).  
 95. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 
(1982).  
 96. Id. at 495.  
 97. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975); Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1972).  
 98. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495.  
 99. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610.  
 100. See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495-96. 
 101. Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 42 A.3d 302, 308 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012); 
Commonwealth v. DiPanfilo, 993 A.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010); Head v. State, 
693 S.E.2d 845, 847-48 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010); Estrich v. State, 995 So.2d 613, 616-17 (Fla. 
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system at the time of driving are, presumably, more likely than the average 
person to be regular users. Finally, in the typical case, some behavior on the 
part of the defendant presumably aroused the suspicion of police officers 
prompting them to test the defendant’s bodily fluids. It is fair to assume, 
then, that the average defendant will be actually impaired at the time of 
arrest. Consequently, arguments about the vagueness of the law will likely 
rely on hypothetical defendants—for example, those that only ingested 
illegal substances long before the time of their arrest or, perhaps less likely, 
those who did so involuntarily. The court would probably not consider 
these hypothetical applications so long as the facts before it reveal a driver 
who voluntarily ingests drugs regularly or did so at some time not too long 
before operating a vehicle.  
As such, the court would likely find, similar to the Broadrick Court, that 
uncertainties concerning how and when the statute might create confusion 
“ha[ve] little relevance . . . where [a defendant’s] conduct falls squarely 
within the ‘hard core’ of the statute’s proscriptions.”102 As in United States 
v. Wurzbach, where the Supreme Court found that the statute in question 
unambiguously applied to the facts before it, an Oklahoma court is likely to 
hold that “[t]he objection to uncertainty . . . need not trouble us now. . . . 
[I]f there is any difficulty . . . it will be time enough to consider it when 
raised by someone whom it concerns.”103  
B. HB 1441: Void for Vagueness? 
Should standing be satisfied, several questions, as articulated by the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Lock v. Falkenstine, would guide 
an Oklahoma court’s vagueness analysis: 
 
! “Is the Statute clear and explicit?”  
! “Is it certain?”  
! “Can a man of ordinary intelligence understand it?”  
! “Does it deceive the common mind?”  
! “Does a person of ordinary intelligence know when the Statute is 
being violated?”  
! “Can the Court judicially determine the Legislative intent?”104 
                                                                                                                 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007); State v. Hammonds, 968 P.2d 601, 603 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). 
 102. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608 (internal quotations omitted). 
 103. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930). 
 104. 1963 OK CR 32, ¶ 12, 380 P.2d 278, 282. 
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As with the overbreadth doctrine, courts also rely on interpretive 
guidelines that effectively err on the side of a statute’s constitutionality.105 
Broadrick can be interpreted as a directive that, noting inherent 
“‘limitations in the English language,’” courts must be reasonable in 
construing statutory language rather than capitulate when “‘prohibitions 
may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost.’”106 Thus, 
“speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical situations not before 
the Court will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is surely valid 
‘in the vast majority of its intended applications.’”107 Oklahoma courts have 
also recognized that “a statute which regulates a substantial number of 
situations validly or covers a whole range of easily identifiable and 
constitutionally proscribable conduct should not be held invalid on its 
face.”108  
Before applying the vagueness questions articulated in Falkenstine to 
Oklahoma’s drugged-driving law, it may be useful to review the language 
of HB 1441. The bill added to the list of those persons punishable for 
operating a motor vehicle on public roadways anyone who 
[h]as any amount of a Schedule I chemical or controlled 
substance, as defined in Section 2–204 of Title 63 of the 
Oklahoma Statutes, or one of its metabolites or analogs in the 
person's blood, saliva, urine or any other bodily fluid at the time 
of a test of such person's blood, saliva, urine or any other bodily 
fluid administered within two (2) hours after the arrest of such 
person[.]109  
This statute seems clear and explicit. Any person who, via specified 
methods, tests positive for a Schedule I substance or its metabolites within 
two hours of an arrest for driving under the influence, will be found guilty 
of that offense. There is little uncertainty here: the language is not deceptive 
and the intent of the legislature is evident—to criminalize the operation of a 
motor vehicle by those potentially impaired by illegal substances. When an 
                                                                                                                 
 105. E.g., Borden’s Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934) (“[I]f any 
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the challenged legislation], 
there is a presumption of the existence of that state of facts . . . .”). 
 106. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 608 (quoting United States Civil Service Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973)).  
 107. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 
U.S. 17, 23 (1960)).  
 108. Pegg v. State, 1983 OK CR 26, ¶ 6, 659 P.2d 370, 373 (citation omitted).  
 109. 2013 Okla. Sess. Law § 11-902(3); H.B. 1441, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013). 
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Ohio court considered similar statutory language, it decided that “[t]here is 
nothing vague, unclear, or indefinite about the statute.”110  
Moreover, the law as written does not apparently lend itself to arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement. In fact, assuming the accuracy of drug 
testing procedures that detect metabolites, one could argue that the law 
eliminates the possibility of such enforcement by ensuring that only those 
who actually have metabolites in their system are prosecuted. The same 
Ohio court came to this conclusion, finding that “the statutory scheme 
discourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by setting precise 
metabolite levels at which driving is prohibited.”111  
Still, opponents of the measure may argue that that the language is 
sufficiently ambiguous that a person of ordinary intelligence either cannot 
understand it or know when it is being violated. One can imagine this 
argument taking two forms. First, a challenger may allege textual 
ambiguity—that the term “metabolite” is neither statutorily defined nor so 
common that the ordinary person can be sure as to its meaning. The second 
argument might allege functional ambiguity: because of basic unfamiliarity 
with metabolism and in the absence of obvious impairment, one who uses 
drugs cannot know when she is legally able to drive and when doing so 
would violate the law. These arguments will be considered in turn.  
1. Textual Ambiguity 
A challenger might argue that the statute is ambiguous in its use of the 
term “metabolite.” Undeniably, HB 1441 does not define the term.112 Under 
such circumstances, the court will look for definitions of the term provided 
by other statutes.113 Metabolite is not defined elsewhere in the Oklahoma 
statutes either, though it is used in the state’s Standards for Workplace Drug 
and Alcohol Testing Act in the definition of the word “drug.”114 When a 
term is not defined anywhere in the statutes, Oklahoma courts recognize the 
“common rule of statutory construction that words in a statute are to be 
understood in their ordinary sense.”115 Were the case to reach it, the Tenth 
                                                                                                                 
 110. State v. Whalen, 2013-Ohio-1861, 991 N.E.2d 738, 742. 
 111. Id. at 743.  
 112. 2013 Okla. Sess. Law ch. 393; H.B. 1441, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013). 
 113. 25 OKLA. STAT. § 2 (2011) (“Whenever the meaning of a word or phrase is defined 
in any statute, such definition is applicable to the same word or phrase wherever it occurs, 
except where a contrary intention plainly appears.”). 
 114. 40 OKLA. STAT. § 552 (2011). 
 115. Gilbert v. State, 1988 OK CR 268, ¶ 5, 765 P.2d 1208, 1210.  
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Circuit would adopt the same interpretation, as it will “interpret state laws 
according to state rules of statutory construction.”116  
Considering this rule of commonsensical interpretation alongside the 
Broadrick Court’s directive of reasonableness,117 an Oklahoma court is 
unlikely to find HB 1441’s use of the term “metabolite” problematic.118 In 
Armstrong, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals was satisfied that 
various securities terms119 that may be unfamiliar to the ordinary person 
uninitiated with financial instruments were “clearly stated and 
understandable by an ordinary person in a commercial context.”120 
Metabolite is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary as “a substance 
produced by metabolism.”121 The Oklahoma courts would likely reason that 
the ordinary person using drugs should be sufficiently familiar with drug 
use to understand that traces of those drugs will remain detectable after the 
period of their immediate impairment. An Oklahoma court would likely 
decide, like the Ohio Supreme Court, that “[a] person of ordinary 
intelligence is certainly capable of understanding the meaning of a 
marihuana metabolite and that driving with the proscribed levels of such a 
metabolite in one's system is prohibited.”122 
2. Functional Ambiguity 
A slightly more sophisticated argument stressing the vagueness of HB 
1441 might propose that it fails to put a reasonable person on notice of 
when she is in violation of the law. Different drugs produce different 
metabolites that remain testable for different periods of time.123 A user’s 
relative experience with the substance, body size and weight, diet, and 
exercise habits—as well as the relative potency of the substance 
consumed—can all affect the pace at which the body metabolizes a drug 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1248 (10th Cir. 2005); accord, Citizens for 
Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1190 (10th 
Cir. 2000); Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1071 n.23 (10th Cir. 1995).  
 117. Supra Part III.B. (discussing the reasonableness directive in the Broadrick Court’s 
analysis).  
 118. Williams v. State, 50 P.3d 1116, 1123 (Nev. 2002) (noting the ordinary meaning of 
the term metabolite and a drug user’s likely familiarity and coming to this same conclusion).  
 119. Armstrong v. State, 1991 OK CR 34, ¶ 18, 811 P.2d 593, 598 (including “security,” 
“broker/dealer,” “issuer,” and “investment advisor”).  
 120. Id. ¶ 20, 811 P.2d at 598. 
 121. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1105 (5th ed. 2011). 
 122. State v. Whalen, 2013-Ohio-1861, 991 N.E.2d 738, 742-43 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2013). 
 123. MAYO CLINIC, Approximate Detection Times Table, http://www.mayomedical 
laboratories.com/test-info/drug-book/viewall.html (last updated Jan. 2011). 
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and how long the metabolites remain testable.124 As such, a person who 
uses drugs will be uncertain about whether and when she may legally 
operate a vehicle.  
This is a logically persuasive argument. It is the argument that was 
presented by the Appellant in Commonwealth v. Etchison.125 It is probably 
also what Michigan Supreme Court Justice Cavanagh had in mind in his 
dissent in People v. Derror.126 There, he observed that a law prohibiting the 
operation of a motor vehicle with any amount of a controlled substance in 
one’s body offered  
no guidance to an ordinary person about when he can legally 
drive given the scientific testimony that 11–carboxy–THC can 
easily be found in a person's system for weeks after marijuana 
was ingested. . . . This lacks any sort of guidance to give a 
person fair notice of when he can legally drive a car.127  
This concern, however, again presents the issue of whether the conduct 
that may be unnecessarily chilled is of the sort that the court is interested in 
protecting. The admonition of the Village of Hoffman Estates Court is 
relevant here: “the most important factor affecting the clarity that the 
Constitution demands of a law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise 
of constitutionally protected rights.”128 Again, the consumption of illegal 
drugs is not the sort of activity the court concerns itself to protect. The 
Whalen court was satisfied with this reasoning, noting that Ohio law 
prohibits the possession or use of marijuana129 in any amount.130 Given this 
prohibition, the court concluded that “[c]ertainly, one who has consumed 
marihuana is on fair notice that metabolites may remain in his system.”131  
An Oklahoma court is likely to hold similarly. HB 1441 prohibits driving 
with metabolites of Schedule I substances in one’s system. As was the case 
                                                                                                                 
 124. Daniel A. Hussar, Overview of Response to Drugs, MERCK MANUAL: CONSUMER 
VERSION, http://www.merckmanuals.com/home/drugs/factors-affecting-response-to-drugs/ 
overview-of-response-to-drugs (last visited July 14, 2015).  
 125. 916 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).  
 126. 715 N.W.2d 822, 836-37 (Mich. 2006), overruled by People v. Feezel, 783 N.W.2d 
67 (Mich. 2010). 
 127. Id. at 843 (Cavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 128. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 
(1982). 
 129. The metabolite in question was a derivative of marijuana. State v. Whalen, 2013-
Ohio-1861, 991 N.E.2d 738, 743. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. 
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in Ohio, Oklahoma law prohibits the possession or use of these substances 
in any amount.132 Oklahoma courts would probably hold that, whatever the 
uncertainty surrounding the timeframe during which metabolites remain 
detectable, all are on notice that driving after consuming illegal drugs puts 
one at risk of a DUI conviction. Essentially, the court would likely reason 
that those who operate a motor vehicle after consuming illegal substances 
do so at their own peril. 
The fear that one who has ingested drugs does not know when she can 
legally drive may be amplified by the possibility that one might ingest a 
controlled substance unwittingly and hence not know of the presence of 
illegal metabolites in her body. Certainly, courts have acknowledged that “a 
scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with 
respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is 
proscribed.”133 However, this reasoning is not reversible. That is, although 
“when a statute might otherwise be vague, a scienter requirement mitigates 
the vagueness and makes the statute constitutional. . . . [T]his does not 
imply . . . that any statute lacking a scienter requirement is necessarily 
vague.”134 Simply put, “a scienter requirement is not necessary to make the 
statute constitutional.”135  
Ultimately, however difficult it may be to decipher the practical effect of 
HB 1441, the statutory language established thereby seems to clearly meet 
the liberal constitutional threshold of exactness. When similar statutory 
language was at issue, the Arizona Court of Appeals dismissed a vagueness 
challenge, finding that “[n]one of the statute’s terms defy common 
understanding, and its interpretation is not dependent on the judgment of 
police officers or prosecutors.”136 Considering the Supreme Court’s 
instruction to interpret reasonably, the requirement that a void statute be 
impermissible in all of its applications, the Court’s concern for the 
constitutionality of the activity that might be disturbed, and the reasonable 
certainty with which the meaning of the statutory language can be derived, 
it seems very unlikely that an Oklahoma court would strike down the HB 
1441 amendment as unconstitutionally vague. Oklahoma would probably 
                                                                                                                 
 132. 63 OKLA. STAT. §§ 2-101, 2-204, 2-401 (2011). 
 133. Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1984); see also Screws v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he requirement of a specific intent to 
do a prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise 
render a vague or indefinite statute invalid.”).  
 134. Ward v. Utah, 398 F.3d 1239, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005).  
 135. Id. 
 136. State v. Phillips, 873 P.2d 706, 709 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
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decide along lines similar to the Supreme Court in United States v. Petrillo, 
where, in upholding the Communications Act of 1934, the Court noted that 
“the Constitution does not require impossible standards. The language here 
challenged conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed 
conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The 
Constitution requires no more.”137 
IV. Equal Protection 
A. Classification 
Some have challenged drugged-driving laws similar to Oklahoma’s on 
equal protection grounds.138 In considering an equal protection challenge, a 
court must first determine the impacted class and whether that class is 
suspect.139 When the law in question establishes a “suspect classification,” 
strict scrutiny is appropriate.140 A quasi-suspect class can trigger 
intermediate scrutiny.141 When no such factors are present, the court will 
apply rational basis review, asking whether the measure in question is 
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.142 
When equal protection challenges have been brought against laws 
criminalizing driving with metabolites in one’s system, some courts have 
passed on the question, finding there to be no classification at all.143 These 
courts conclude that drugged-driving laws treat everyone equally—any 
driver who tests positive for illicit metabolites is liable for driving under the 
influence.144 Some have argued, however, that laws like Oklahoma’s have 
the effect of discriminating between drivers who are unimpaired by the 
metabolites in their system from those who are legitimately impaired.145 
Moreover, the law seems to at least classify drivers with metabolites in their 
system as distinguished from those without.146  
                                                                                                                 
 137. 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947). 
 138. E.g., Commonwealth v. Etchison, 916 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007); Love 
v. State, 517 S.E.2d 53, 55 (Ga. 1999); Phillips, 873 P.2d at 709.  
 139. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985). 
 140. Id. at 440. 
 141. Id. at 440-43. 
 142. Id. at 440-42. 
 143. Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1174; Love, 517 S.E.2d at 55-56. 
 144. Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1174; Love, 517 S.E.2d at 55-56.  
 145. Etchison, 916 A.2d at 1173; Love, 517 S.E.2d at 55; State v. Phillips, 873 P.2d 706, 
709-10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
 146. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-902(A)(3). 
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While there may be room to question whether HB 1441 classifies at all, 
there can be little doubt that any class it does establish is not a suspect one. 
In considering whether a legislative classification is suspect, courts will 
consider whether members of the class suffer from significant disabilities, 
are historically subject to discriminatory treatment, or relegated to political 
powerlessness in a majoritarian society.147 Courts may also ask whether the 
defining characteristic of the group in question is relevant to its members’ 
ability to participate in society and whether that trait is immutable.148 
Unimpaired drugged drivers exhibit none of these “traditional indicia of 
suspectness.”149 In fact, those classes that have been recognized by the 
Court as suspect are relatively few and are only sure to include race, 
national origin, and religion.150 It is exceedingly difficult to imagine an 
argument that effectively construes HB 1441 as facially classifying in any 
of these ways. 
B. Rational Basis 
In the absence of a suspect class, the appropriate level of scrutiny is 
rational basis.151 Other states have analyzed drugged-driving challenges 
accordingly.152 The relevant question is whether HB 1441’s inclusion of 
metabolites is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. There 
can be little question that the government purpose motivating HB 1441 is a 
legitimate one. While the legislative record is inconclusive, surely, the 
legislature was largely motivated by a concern for safety on public 
roadways. As such, a viable equal protection challenge is likely limited to 
question the rational relationship prong, arguing that there is no rational 
relationship between the inclusion of metabolites in the statute and the 
government’s legitimate purpose. Appellants in other states have usually 
argued their case this way.153 
While rational basis is a relatively easy test for the state to satisfy, courts 
certainly do not end their analysis once they arrive at this level of scrutiny. 
When a Texas city refused to grant a zoning permit to a group home for the 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 148. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686-87 (1973). 
 149. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28. 
 150. Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 
146 (2011). 
 151. City of Cleburne v. Cleburn Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-42 (1985). 
 152. E.g., Commonwealth v. Etchsion, 916 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Pa. Super Ct. 2007); 
Williams v. State, 50 P.3d 1116, 1120 (Nev. 2002); State v. Hammonds, 968 P.2d 601, 604 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998).  
 153. E.g., Hammonds, 968 P.2d at 604. 
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mentally handicapped, the Court applied the rational basis test to strike 
down their decision.154 The court found no rational relationship between the 
city’s decision to block the permit and any legitimate city interest, deciding 
that the decision rested instead on “irrational prejudice.”155  
C. HB 1441: A Rational Basis 
HB 1441, however, is likely to pass the rational basis test. First, 
Oklahoma courts will probably find that the statute’s inclusion of 
metabolites is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in roadway 
safety. Opponents of drugged-driving laws may argue that, because 
metabolites do not evidence impairment, there is no rational relationship 
between their criminalization and the legislative purpose of safe driving. 
However, state courts have mostly followed Arizona’s example in holding 
that the potential danger that those who have ingested illegal substances 
pose to other drivers is sufficiently grave to justify slightly over-inclusive 
statutory responses.156 After all, the presence of even an inactive metabolite 
certainly does evidence prior drug use and, even if it does not evidence 
current impairment, it certainly does not demonstrate that the driver was not 
impaired.157  
Furthermore, “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact 
finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence 
or empirical data.”158 The Court of Appeals in Arizona, therefore, found 
that “the legislature was reasonable in determining that there is no level of 
illicit drug use which can be acceptably combined with driving a vehicle; 
the established potential for lethal consequences is too great.”159 The 
Supreme Court of Georgia also reasoned in upholding that state’s drugged-
driving law that “the legislature has made it easier for persons to 
                                                                                                                 
 154. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448-50. 
 155. Id. at 450. 
 156. E.g., Hammonds, 968 P.2d at 604; see also Williams, 50 P.3d at 1121; Love v. State, 
517 S.E.2d 53, 56-57 (Ga. 1999); State v. Phillips, 873 P.2d 706, 709-10 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1994).  
 157. State ex rel. Montgomery v. Harris ex rel. Cnty. Of Maricopa, 301 P.3d 580, 582-83 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2013), vacated on other grounds by 322 P.3d 160 (2014); Hammonds, 968 
P.2d at 604 (“[T]he presence of an inactive and nonimpairing metabolite of an illicit drug in 
a driver’s urine does not necessarily mean that there is no active component of that drug 
present in the driver’s blood.”); Phillips, 873 P.2d at 710 (“[T]here can be no meaningful 
quantification because of the dangers inherent in the drugs themselves and in the lack of 
potency predictability.”).  
 158. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
 159. State v. Phillips, 873 P.2d 706, 710 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
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‘understand and accept that they are legally unable to drive if they consume 
virtually any amount of [marijuana].’”160  
Courts are commonly deferential in this regard. “In seeking to protect the 
life and health of its citizenry, the legislature cannot be required to forego 
an effective prophylactic measure simply because it may be somewhat 
imprecise.”161 Therefore, Oklahoma courts would likely reason that 
“[p]roviding for stiffer penalties . . . regardless of whether [the] influence 
impaired the driver, is certainly rationally related to the goal of 
discouraging people from driving under the influence.”162 
Moreover, the court need not solely consider the relationship of the 
measure to the goal of the particular legislative enactment in which it is 
included. That is to say, roadway safety need not be the only government 
interest with which the court concerns itself. Instead, the court may ask if 
the disputed measure furthers any legitimate purpose.163 An enactment 
“must be upheld against an equal protection challenge if there is any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for 
the classification.”164 The court could thus easily find that HB 1441’s 
inclusion of metabolites is rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest in deterring drug use altogether. The Arizona Court of Appeals 
reasoned in this way in upholding the constitutionality of a similarly 
worded statute.165 The court held that “generally deterring illegal drug use” 
is a legitimate state interest and that this provided rational basis for the 
operation of the law beyond the obvious purpose of keeping roadways 
safe.166  
These observations suggest that Oklahoma courts would be unlikely to 
strike down HB 1441 under the equal protection clause. First, the law may 
not classify at all drivers are subject to the same treatment under the law. 
Second, an equal protection challenge would be analyzed under the rational 
basis test. Courts would very likely conclude there exists a rational basis for 
Oklahoma’s decision to prohibit driving with proscribed substances in 
one’s system.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 160. Love, 517 S.E.2d at 57 (quoting Barnett v. State, 510 S.E.2d 527, 528 (Ga. 1999)). 
 161. Hammonds, 968 P.2d at 604. 
 162. Commonwealth v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 370 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
 163. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993). 
 164. Id. at 313. 
 165. Hammonds, 968 P.2d at 604-05. 
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V. Special Laws 
Oklahoma law generally prohibits a statute from applying only to an 
arbitrarily selected part of the population. Article 5, section 46 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution provides, in pertinent part: 
The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this 
Constitution, pass any local or special law: . . . . Regulating the 
practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in 
judicial proceedings or inquiry before the courts, justices of the 
peace, sheriffs, commissioners, arbitrators, or other tribunals, or 
providing or changing the methods for the collection of debts, or 
the enforcement of judgments or prescribing the effect of judicial 
sales of real estate.167 
Furthermore, section 59 of the same article provides that “[l]aws of a 
general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State, and 
where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be 
enacted.”168 
A. Special Laws: An Analytical Framework 
In general terms, a law “‘is special if it confers particular privileges or 
imposes peculiar disabilities or burdensome conditions in the exercise of a 
common right on a class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general 
body of those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of the 
law.’”169 In more specific terms, special laws “apply to less than the whole 
of a class of persons, entities or things standing upon the same footing or in 
substantially the same situation or circumstances, and hence do not have a 
uniform operation.”170 
Oklahoma courts have long been averse to laws of this kind. In fact, the 
prohibition of special laws in Oklahoma courts traces back prior to 
statehood. In 1886, the United States Congress subjected Oklahoma 
Territory to a law that enacted language very similar to that which found its 
                                                                                                                 
 167. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 46 (emphasis added). 
 168. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59. 
 169. Oklahoma City v. Griffin, 1965 OK 76, ¶ 3, 403 P.2d 463, 467 (quoting Serve 
Yourself Gasoline Stations Ass’n v. Brock, 249 P.2d 545, 549 (Cal. 1952)). 
 170. Fenimore v. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office, 1948 OK 93, ¶ 9, 194 P.2d 852, 
854. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
858 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:833 
 
 
way into the state’s constitution.171 Courts have since recognized the “vice” 
of special laws in that they “create preference and establish inequality. They 
apply to persons, things, and places possessed of certain qualities or 
situations and exclude from their effect other persons, things, or places 
which are not dissimilar in this respect.”172 
Of course, sections 46 and 59 of article 5 are not identical. Section 46 
lists specific legislative areas in which special laws are categorically 
impermissible.173 Section 59 provides that general laws should be preferred 
to special laws any time the former can be adequately tailored to suit the 
same purposes.174 “[S]ection 46 is an unequivocal mandate”—any special 
law in the enumerated areas is invalid.175 Accordingly, “[t]he single 
question for testing a statute’s compliance with section 46 is whether the 
statute is a general law or a special law.”176 
As for section 59 challenges, courts have developed a three-prong test 
for review. This test asks (1) whether the law is general or special; (2) if it 
is special, whether a general law would satisfy the same purpose; and (3) 
whether the special nature of the law “is reasonably and substantially 
related to [] valid legislative objective[s].”177 
Thus, whether it is challenged under section 46 or 59, a central question 
facing any court that hears such a challenge will be whether HB 1441 is in 
fact a special law. In 1937, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that a 
general law must operate uniformly as applied to all similarly situated 
persons under its operation.178 By contrast, “[a] special law is one which 
relates to . . . particular persons or things of a class, or which operates on or 
over a portion of a class instead of all of the class.”179 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Guthrie Daily Leader v. Cameron, 1895 OK 71, ¶¶ 24-25, 41 P. 635, 638. For 
further historical understanding of Oklahoma’s special law prohibition, see Territory v. 
School Dist. No. 83, 1901 OK 22, 64 P. 241.  
 172. Sch. Dist. No. 85 v. Sch. Dist. No. 71, 1928 OK 689, ¶ 4, 276 P. 186, 186, 
superseded on other grounds by OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 5 (noting the inequality of special 
laws in the syllabus). 
 173. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 46. 
 174. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59. 
 175. Lafalier v. Lead-Impacted Communities Relocation Assistance Trust, 2010 OK 48, 
¶ 26, 237 P.3d 181, 192; accord EOG Res. Mktg., Inc. v. Bd. Of Equalization, 2008 OK 95, 
¶ 24, 196 P.3d 511, 522; Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 2006 OK 98, ¶ 7, 152 P.3d 861, 865. 
 176. Lafalier, ¶ 26, 237 P.3d at 192. 
 177. E.g., id. ¶¶ 33-35, 237 P.3d at 194-95; EOG Res. Mktg., ¶¶ 19-20, 196 P.3d at 521. 
 178. In re Annexation of Reno Quartermaster Depot Military Reservation, 1937 OK 391, 
¶¶ 12-14, 69 P.2d 659, 661.  
 179. Id.  
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Before further considering the applicability of the special laws 
prohibition to HB 1441, it is worth noting an important guideline for courts 
reviewing special laws challenges: Similar to previously discussed 
constitutional challenges, Oklahoma courts recognize a presumption in 
favor of the constitutionality of a law challenged as special.180 Accordingly, 
when a statute is susceptible to multiple meanings, the duty of the court is 
to give it that construction that avoids constitutional defect.181 More 
importantly, this rule requires that a law be upheld unless it is “clearly, 
palpably, and plainly inconsistent with the Constitution.”182 The 
presumption of constitutionality casts a “heavy burden” on those making a 
special laws challenge.183 The court must indulge every presumption in 
favor of constitutionality.184 
B. The Inapplicability of Section 46 
As explained, section 46 categorically prohibits the enactment of special 
laws in certain areas of legislative concern.185 Regulating the practice of 
courts and changing the rules of evidence used by courts are both 
enumerated areas.186 A clever opponent of HB 1441 might argue that the 
Act regulates the practices of courts and changes their rules of evidence by 
eliminating the traditional requirement that the state demonstrate actual 
impairment for DUI liability. This argument is unlikely to prevail. 
Oklahoma already imposes per se liability for driving under the influence of 
alcohol, punishing any driver with a blood-alcohol concentration of .08 or 
higher without regard to actual impairment.187 It would be untenable, then, 
to contend that HB 1441’s creation of per se liability for drugged driving 
uniquely changes the rules of evidence or regulates the practice of courts.  
Moreover, to the extent that a court was persuaded that HB 1441 does 
fall within the purview of section 46, it would still have to resolve the 
question of whether the Act constitutes a special law. As such, the 
                                                                                                                 
 180. Bishop v. City of Tulsa, 1922 OK CR 144, ¶ 14, 209 P. 228, 229; Kinney v. Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs, 1995 OK CIV APP 49, ¶ 6, 894 P.2d 444, 446. 
 181. State ex rel. Macy v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Oklahoma, 1999 OK 53, ¶ 16, 986 
P.2d 1130, 1139.  
 182. Lafalier, ¶ 15, 237 P.3d at 188.  
 183. Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶ 8, 260 P.3d 1251, 1254.  
 184. Id. 
 185. Lafalier, 2010 OK 46, ¶ 26, 237 P.3d at 192; EOG Res. Mktg., Inc. v. Bd. of 
Equalization, 2008 OK 95, ¶ 18, 196 P.3d 511, 526; Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 2006 OK 98, ¶ 7, 
152 P.3d 861, 865. 
 186. See supra note 185. 
 187. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-902(A)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
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following discussion of whether HB 1441 qualifies as a special law within 
the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution is relevant to section 46 as well. 
C. A Framework for Section 59 
Assessing HB 1441 for compliance with section 59 requires ascertaining, 
first, whether it is a special or general law. In 1924, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court explained the distinction: “[A] statute relating to persons or things as 
a class is a general law, but one relating to particular persons or things of a 
class is special.”188 More specifically, a law is special if it treats differently 
part of a class of similarly situated persons.189 Therefore, “[t]o determine 
whether or not a statute is general or specific, courts will look to the statute 
to ascertain whether it will operate uniformly upon all the persons and parts 
of the state that are brought within the relation and circumstances provided 
by it.”190 
In recent years, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has had occasion to 
consider the special laws prohibition in twice invalidating efforts by state 
lawmakers to elevate pleading requirements for medical malpractice 
plaintiffs.191 The language of the modern court largely mirrors that of its 
predecessors: 
A special law confers some right or imposes some duty on some 
but not all of the class of those who stand upon the same footing 
and same relation to the subject of the law. A law is special if it 
confers particular privileges or imposes peculiar disabilities or 
burdensome conditions in the exercise of a common right on a 
class of persons arbitrarily selected from the general body of 
those who stand in precisely the same relation to the subject of 
the law.192 
Moreover, in the context of laws that affect the courts, as HB 1441 arguably 
does, the court has held that the Oklahoma Constitution demands 
“procedure be symmetrical and apply equally across the board.”193 
  
                                                                                                                 
 188. City of Sapulpa v. Land, 1924 OK 92, ¶ 24, 223 P. 640, 643; accord Grable v. 
Childers, 1936 OK 273, ¶ 6, 56 P.2d 357, 360. 
 189. Thomas, ¶ 13, 260 P.3d at 1256; Arrow Trucking Co. v. Jimenez, 2010 OK CIV 
APP 9, ¶ 18, 231 P.3d 741, 747. 
 190. Burks v. Walker, 1909 OK 317, ¶ 23, 109 P. 544, 549. 
 191. Wall v. Marouk, 2013 OK 36, 302 P.3d 775; Zeier v. Zimmer Inc., 2006 OK 98, 
152 P.3d 861. 
 192. Marouk, ¶ 5, 302 P.3d at 779. 
 193. Zeier, ¶ 13, 152 P.3d at 867.  
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1. Classification and Legitimacy 
It is tempting to read these formulations of the law to prohibit any 
classification among persons that the law affects. This reading, however, 
would obscure the court’s emphasis on those persons “similarly 
situated,”194 defined as those who “stand in precisely the same relation to 
the subject of the law.”195 Indeed, it is not essential that a law be so 
universal in its application as to operate the same on all persons in the 
state.196 Rather, a law may have local application, so long as it operates 
equally “upon all the subjects within the class for which it was adopted.”197 
Put differently, the Oklahoma Constitution does not prohibit the legislature 
from making any classification; it prohibits only a classification that is 
“capricious or arbitrary.”198  
This clarifies the task facing courts considering a special laws challenge 
to HB 1441. For these courts, “[t]he most important factor in determining 
whether a law is special or general is the basis of the classification 
contained in it.”199 Classification “is the grouping of things because they 
agree with one another in certain particulars and differ from other things in 
those same particulars.”200 Thus, the legitimacy of a classification will 
depend on the things or persons—the class—involved.201 
The next step is to determine whether the basis for classification is 
legitimate. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has provided that in order for a 
classification to be permissible, “there must be some distinctive 
characteristic warranting different treatment and that furnishes a practical 
and reasonable basis for discrimination.”202 Conversely, a classification is 
arbitrary and capricious if it divides a natural, homogenous class and treats 
some members differently from others.203 Attentive to this distinction, the 
Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals recently upheld a provision of the 
Worker’s Compensation Act that provided for differential treatment for 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Grable v. Childers, 1936 OK 273, ¶ 6, 56 P.2d 357, 360. 
 195. Marouk, ¶ 5, 302 P.3d at 779. 
 196. Wilkinson v. Hale, 1939 OK 11, ¶ 10, 86 P.2d 305, 307. 
 197. Burks v. Walker, 1909 OK 317, ¶ 23, 109 P. 544, 549. 
 198. Id.; accord Tulsa Exposition & Fair Corp. v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 1970 OK 67, ¶ 
9, 468 P.2d 501, 505; Haas v. Holloman, 1958 OK 174, ¶ 18, 327 P.2d 655, 656.  
 199. Kinney v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 1995 OK CIV APP 49, ¶ 7, 894 P.2d 444, 447. 
 200. Anderson v. Walker, 1958 OK 297, ¶ 15, 333 P.2d 570, 574. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Grant v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 2000 OK 41, ¶ 10, 5 P.3d 594, 598; accord 
EOG Res. Mktg., Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 2008 OK 95, ¶ 20, 196 P.3d 511, 521; Kinney, 
¶ 6, 894 P.2d at 447. 
 203. Anderson, ¶ 15, 333 P.2d at 574. 
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persons with soft-tissue injuries on the basis of whether a physician had 
recommended corrective surgery for their injury.204 The court concluded 
that whether or not surgery is recommended for a soft tissue injury is the 
kind of distinctive characteristic that reasonably warrants discrimination.205 
Similarly, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld an early version 
of the state’s prohibition on the possession of narcotics that carved out an 
exception for pharmacists.206 In both cases, the court was satisfied that the 
classification established by the legislature was not arbitrary or capricious. 
These precedents suggest that a court’s analysis will be primarily 
concerned with whether a statutory classification bears a reasonable 
relationship to its legislative objective.207 Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court has suggested that “[w]ere the Legislature to distinguish between red-
haired men and blackhaired men,” that classification would likely be 
invalidated as it has only an arbitrary relation to the purpose of any 
legislative effort.208 To the extent that the relationship between legislative 
classification and purpose is at issue, special laws inquiry is somewhat 
similar to equal protection analysis.209 Thus, the question concerning HB 
1441 is, first, whether it classifies, and, if so, whether that classification is 
arbitrary or reasonably relates to the purpose of the legislature in drafting 
the Act. 
2. HB 1441: a Legitimate Classification 
HB 1441 probably “classifies” within the meaning of sections 46 and 59. 
It divides the natural class of “drivers” to treat differently those members of 
the class that test positive for illicit metabolites. However, Oklahoma courts 
are likely to find that this classification is rationally related to legislative 
purpose and, as such, not arbitrary or capricious.  
First, courts are likely to accept the argument that the inclusion of 
metabolites is rationally related to roadway safety.210 After all, the presence 
of these metabolites does not demonstrate non-impairment even if it is not 
direct evidence of impairment.211 Furthermore, the legislature is allowed 
                                                                                                                 
 204. Arrow Trucking Co. v. Jimenez, 2012 OK CIV APP 9, ¶ 21, 231 P.3d 741, 747-48. 
 205. Id. ¶ 19-21, 231 P.3d at 747-48. 
 206. Carr v. State, 1923 OK CR 334, 220 P. 479 (1923). 
 207. See Williams v. Starr, 1975 OK CIV APP 13, ¶ 4, 534 P.2d 29, 30 (finding that 
plaintiff must show that “there exists no legitimate relationship between the objective of the 
legislation and the restrictive classification employed”). 
 208. Anderson, ¶ 15, 333 P.2d at 574. 
 209. Jones v. Integris Baptist Med. Ctr., 2008 OK CIV APP 14, ¶ 12, 178 P.3d 191, 196.  
 210. See supra Part III.C. 
 211. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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substantial deference in making policy determinations, such as the 
determination that any evidence of drug ingestion is too dangerous to be 
permitted.212 Conducting a special laws analysis, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma recently noted that “[i]t is not the role of this Court to question 
the desirability, wisdom, or logic of a valid statutory classification.”213 
This deferential treatment of legislative classification, in concert with the 
directive to indulge every presumption in favor of the statute’s 
constitutionality,214 suggests courts would probably decide that HB 1441 is 
a legitimate classification. A court would probably find the class of drivers 
with metabolites in their system present an elevated risk of roadway hazard 
and as such do not sit in exactly the same relation to the law as do those 
without such metabolites—like the recommendation of surgery for soft-
tissue damage,215 the presence of metabolites establishes a reasonable basis 
for discrimination. As such, HB 1441’s classification is not arbitrary or 
capricious. 
The caution exercised by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in striking down 
medical malpractice reform is worth considering here: 
In construing the constitutionality of a statute, we are not 
authorized to consider its propriety, wisdom, or practicability as 
a working proposition. Those questions are clearly and definitely 
established by our fundamental law to a certainty as functions of 
the legislative department. We uphold the legislative enactment 
unless the statute is clearly, palpably and plainly inconsistent 
with the constitution.216 
Similarly, while HB 1441 may be an unwise and unscientific approach to 
drugged—driving, its wisdom is not a justiciable question for courts. 
Because the legislative class established by the law bears a reasonable 
relationship to its goal—safety on Oklahoma roads—and because that 
classification is neither arbitrary nor capricious, HB 1441 is not plainly and 
palpably inconsistent with the Oklahoma Constitution and is likely to 
survive a special laws challenge. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 212. See supra note 161-162 and accompanying text. 
 213. EOG Res. Mktg., Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 2008 OK 95, ¶ 20, 196 P.3d 511, 521.  
 214. See supra notes 180-184 and accompanying text. 
 215. Arrow Trucking Co. v. Jimenez, 2012 OK CIV APP 9, ¶ 21, 231 P.3d 741, 747-48. 
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VI. Eighth Amendment 
Opponents of drugged-driving laws have also made the case that the 
laws violate the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause. While Eighth Amendment challenges traditionally concern the 
severity of a punishment imposed for criminal behavior, the Supreme Court 
recognized in Robinson v. California that the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause also prohibits criminal laws that punish a “status” as 
opposed to an act.217 In Robinson, the Court struck down a California law 
that established criminal liability for narcotics addiction.218 The Court’s 
decision was heavily influenced by its finding that addiction is a disease.219 
Therefore, the Court held, “a state law which imprisons a person thus 
afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug 
within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a 
cruel and unusual punishment.”220 
One might draw analogies between HB 1441 and the California law 
invalidated in Robinson. Oklahoma’s drugged-driving law would adversely 
affect drug addicts to the extent that they are more likely to test positive for 
illegal metabolites at any given time. Moreover, Oklahoma’s law implicates 
some activity that may have occurred outside the state, as in the case of 
someone who ingested marijuana in a jurisdiction that permits it. Thus, 
some argue that a law like Oklahoma’s, by criminalizing driving with 
metabolites long after impairment, “contributes to punishing status as a 
user, not protecting safety, a premise that was expressly found to be 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.”221 
Applying the Robinson doctrine to drugged-driving laws, however, 
requires examining the Supreme Court’s attempt at clarifying that doctrine. 
In Powell v. Texas, the Court revisited Robinson, considering whether a 
“chronic alcoholic” could be constitutionally convicted of a Texas law 
prohibiting public intoxication.222 The trial court had not allowed the 
defendant to claim that his alcoholism rendered his drunken appearance in 
public “not of his own volition.”223  
                                                                                                                 
 217. 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).  
 218. Id.  
 219. Id.  
 220. Id.  
 221. Aaron J. Marcus, Are the Roads a Safer Place Because Drug Offenders Aren’t on 
Them?: An Analysis of Punishing Drug Offenders with License Suspensions, 13 KAN. J.L. & 
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 222. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).  
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The Powell court was not convinced that alcoholism was a medical 
disease.224 It was also not persuaded by Powell’s argument that his 
compulsion to drink overwhelmed his ability to rationally choose to 
refrain.225 This suggests that a challenge to HB 1441 would probably fail if 
premised, like Powell’s challenge, on the argument that addiction 
undermines the ability of the defendant to choose whether or not to drive. 
Moreover, this argument would be untenable in a drugged-driving 
challenge. Simply put, it would be illogical for a defendant to argue 
simultaneously that the metabolite in her system did not impair her ability 
to drive and that the effect of her substance use so impaired her decision-
making abilities as to prevent her from making a rational choice. In at least 
this way, the argument that metabolite laws reach too far cuts both ways.  
More importantly, though, the Powell decision further clarified the 
Robinson Court’s rule against status offenses in a way that renders 
irrelevant the argument that one did not “choose” to drive. The Powell 
Court determined that what was missing from the California law at issue in 
Robinson was an actus reus: “[t]he entire thrust of Robinson's 
interpretation . . . is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the 
accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which 
society has an interest in preventing.”226 By contrast, the Court insisted, the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause “does not deal with the question of 
whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in 
some sense, ‘involuntary’ or ‘occasioned by a compulsion.’”227 The 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the Robinson rule: “[a] 
person should be convicted only for what he does, not for what he is.”228 
Were it challenged under the Eighth Amendment, Oklahoma’s law 
would likely survive. In such a challenge, the court would probably 
conclude the law punishes the act of driving with metabolites in one’s 
system, rather than any particular driver’s status as an addict or drug user. 
Thus, HB 1441 contains an actus reus—operating a motor vehicle while 
illicit metabolites are present in one’s bodily fluids. An Oklahoma court 
would likely decide along lines similar to those in the Powell decision: 
Oklahoma “has not sought to punish a mere status, as California did in 
Robinson. . . . Rather, it has imposed . . . a criminal sanction for public 
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behavior which may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for 
appellant and for members of the general public.”229 
VII. Conclusion 
By creating criminal liability for “driving under the influence” without 
regard to whether evidence of guilt actually demonstrates impairment, HB 
1441 disregards the moral culpability of an offender. This dismays many 
observers because it divorces criminal law from one of its most central 
justifications—that criminal prosecution should be brought against behavior 
that society deems morally blameworthy.230 This criticism, however, is 
insufficient ground for courts—under the restraint of doctrinal restrictions 
informed by deference to the legislature—to invalidate the law.  
While HB 1441 may seemingly overreach by authorizing punishment for 
driving under the influence of marijuana of someone who was not actually 
impaired while behind the wheel, an overbreadth challenge to the law 
*Because the language of the law gives fair notice of what conduct it 
proscribes and avoids arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, a 
vagueness challenge is also unlikely to prevail. Furthermore, because HB 
1441’s classificatory scheme is rationally related to legitimate state 
interests, an equal protection challenge would probably fail. Similarly, this 
reasonable relationship between the law’s classification and legislative 
purpose would probably prevent the success of a special laws challenge. 
Finally, HB 1441 criminalizes a particular act—driving while “under the 
influence” of schedule I metabolites—compliant with the Supreme Court’s 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and so a challenge of that kind is also 
unlikely to succeed.  
Ultimately, opponents of HB 1441 will not likely find remedy in the 
courts. Instead, their hope for repeal or reform of the law probably lies with 
the legislature. This is discouraging—the only hope for correcting what 
strikes many as a patent legislative injustice is in the hands of the very same 
lawmakers who enacted the bill little more than two years ago.  
 
Blake Johnson 
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